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Abstract
Both reproductive medicine and genetics are seeing rapid, and in some instances revolutionary, medical and scientific advances.
Courtshavebeencailedupontoresolveavariety of novel disputes arising from these areas, and more can be anticipated as these
technologies continue to develop and their use becomes more widespread. This article discusses some of the most relevant areas
of the law and litigation that currently bear on reproduction and genetics or that may be anticipated to do so in the future. Specific
developments and judicial decisions addressing them include: legal theories of wrongful birth and wrongful life and their
application to children bom with genetic impairments; a physician's duty to wam family members about a relative's genetic
disease; disputes over reproductive materials and non-reproductive cells and tissues: unauthorized genetic testing in the
workplace; and genetic discrimination. It is hoped that this discussion will be of value to medical and legal professionals and
policy makers who work with these concepts in the increasingly inter-related fields of law and medicine.
Keywords: generic discrimination, misuse of reproductive material. POD. reproductive genetics, reproductive technologv law.
wrongful conception
Introduction
Reproductive genetics, meaning Ihe use of reproduciive and
genetic technologies to both provide prospective parents with
information about a future child and to avoid having a child
with a genetic abnormality, is a rapidly evolving area of
medicine. As with many of the new reproduciive lechiiologies.
courts have been called upon to resolve a variety of disputes
arising from reproductive geneiics, and more can be
anticipated as these technologies continue to develop and their
use becomes more widespread.
Reproductive genetic testing has been used for several decades
to inform prospective parents about their risk of producing a
child with a genetic disorder. Prospective parents can be
screened to determine if they are carriers of a genetic disease
("carrier screening') before they initiate pregnancy. Most of
the time, however, carrier screening occurs once pregnancy
has already begun. In addition, prenatal testing can be
performed, in which the fetal DNA is tested for genetic defects
using amniocentesis or chorionic villus sampling (CVS).
In past decades, the number of genetic tests available was
fairly limited. Now. however, there are tests for over 1000
genetic diseases available either commercially or as part of
research (GeneTests®http://www.genetests.org), and the
availability of these tests has influenced standards of medical
care. For example, in 2001, the American College of
Obstetrics and Gynecology and the American College of
Medical Genetics recommended thai the genetic test for cystic
fibrosis be made available to all couples seeking preconception
or prenatal care, and offered to all couples in ethnic or racial
groups considered at higher risk for carrying the CF gene
( G r o d y et ai.,2{K)]).
In the pasi 10 years, .scientists have developed a method called
preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) to test embryos
directly for genetic defects before they are implanted into a
woman's uterus. This lechnology requires that the woman
undergo IVF in order to obtain eggs and create the embryos for
testing. In PGD. embryologists remove one or two cells from
an embryo and perform genetic testing on the DNA from the
celt(s). Those embryos found to be free tVom the genetic defect
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can then be selected for implantation. In the future, scientists
may even be able to correct genetic abnormalities before birth
using gemiline jzene therapy.
Both assisted reproduction (often referred to as 'assisted
reproductive technology") and genetics have raised novel
issue.s for the courts over the past few decades. Donor
insemination, which predates most of the newer, more
complicated technologies, is not routinely considered a form
of assisted reproduction from a medical perspective. The
combination of these technologies has increa.sed the range and
complexity of the decisions Judges have been called upon to
make. Assisted reproduction has raised a variety of legal issues
including: (i) control and custody of embryos; (ii) access to
assisted reproduction services; (iii) parentage of children
conceived through donor gametes: and (iv) liability for
misappropriation of gametes and embryos.
Genetic technologies have also raised many legal issues,
including: (i) ownership and control of genetic material and
information; (ii) misappropriation of genetic material; (iii)
discrimination based on genetic information, e.g. in
employment or insurance; (iv) liability for failure to detect or
warn about a genetic disorder through genetic testing; and (v)
privacy rights and compelled testing.
In considering legal questions in the context of novel
reproductive genetic technologies, courts are likely to draw
upon existing precedents (previously decided cases in relevant,
if not identical, contexts) for guidance. For example, the legal
theories of "wrongful birth' and "wrongful life", discussed
below, first arose before the advent of prenatal and
preconception genetic testing, but have since been asserted in
these contexts. This article will provide a discussion of the
most relevant areas ofthe law and litigation that currently bear
on reproductive genetics or that can be anticipated to do so in
the future.
Court cases arising from ohildren
born with genetic or other birth
defects
Carrier screening and prenatal testing tor some genetic
condiiions. such as Tay Sachs disease and Down syndrome,
have been available tor many years, and before prenatal
genetic testing vi-as available, doctors employed other tests to
assess fetal health. There is thus a large body of case law in the
United States arising from lawsuits against health care
professionals following the birth of a child with an impairment
that was either not discovered in the fetus through prenatal
testing or not foreseen prior to conception by proper screening
or diagnosis of the parents. Legal theories or 'claims'
supporting such lawsuits are generally referred to as wrongful
birth and wrongful lite claims, although various courts may
characterize such theories simply as negligence, professional
negligence, or medical malpractice.
Wrongful birth claims are those brought by parents alleging
that, but for the defendant's negligence, they would have
aborted or never conceived the child. Wrongful life claims are
those brought by (or on behalf of) children alleging that, but
tor the defendant's negligence, they would not have been born.
Claims for wrongful binh and wrongful lile are most often
brought against the physicians who performed or tailed to
offer or perform prenatal testing or preconception genetic
testing, hospitals or medical practices that employed such
physicians, and genetics laboratories that provided or failed to
provide the testing services.
There is also a large body of law involving children, healthy or
otherwise, bom foliowing a failed sterilization, abortion or
pregnancy diagnosis. Courts throughout the US differ widely
in their terminology, characterizing these claims variably as
"wrongful conception", 'wrongful pregnancy", professional
negligence, medical malpractice, or simply negligence. (For
ease of reference, all such claims will be referred to here as
wrongful conception.) Wrongful conception claims are
generally filed by parents against the physician land the
hospital or medical practice employing him or her) who
performed the negligent sterilization or abortion or who failed
to diagnose a pregnancy. These cases and the analyses the
courts apply may provide relevant precedent for cases
involving reproductive genetics testing since parents will
similarly claim that, 'but for" the mis.sed diagnosis, they would
not have attempted a pregnancy. This theory may be an even
stronger legal basis for such claims, since in almost every
instance the pre-conception procedure will have been
undertaken for the very purpose of hoping to avoid conceiving
a child without a genetic abnormality, and therefore both
causation and injury may be provable.
Before turning to particular cases, it should be noted that the
same legal principles apply regardless of whether the child's
impairment is genetic or not, and often regardless of when it
was discovered (i.e. after birth, during pregnancy, or pre-
conception), so that older court decisions may provide
guidance in newer areas as well. As can be seen in subsequent
sections of this article, these legal principles have been
invoked by courts in the relatively few cases that ha\e been
brought involving new reproductive genetic technologies.
It should also be noted that the claims, or "causes of action',
meaning the legal theories that a court will permit to support a
lawsuit, are typically governed by state law. and therefore vary
from state to state. Thus, this overview should be used as a
guide rather than definitive evidence of the status of the law in
a particular jurisdiction. Finally, this overview focuses
primarily on court decisions from the highest state courts,
since these provide 'precedent' (rules or interpretations of
law), which lower courts in that same state must follow. Some
federal court decisions that have interpreted a state's laws are
also reviewed, since those interpretations are often given great
weight within a state.
Wrongful birth court decisions
Within a state, cases are initiated in a trial (lower) court, which
renders a decision that is binding on the parties to the dispute,
but not binding as legal precedent for other or future cases in
that state. If the losing party appeals, the decision may be
reviewed by an intermediate appellate court and/or the state's
highest appellate court. The ruling by a state's highest court
must be followed by all other courts within that state. In some
circumstances, such as when the disputing parties are from
different states and the amount of money involved in the
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dispute is sufficiently large, a federal court may have
•jurisdiction', meaning the legal authority to hear the case. In
those situations, the case may instead be brought and tried in
federal court. Wr{)ngful birth claims arc ruled by state, not
federal law. so a federal court hearing a wrongful birth case will
be called on to interpret the applicable state law. The ruling by a
federal court is not binding on state courts, but is often given
significant deference.
Twenly-six states have high state court or federal court decisions
ihat recogni/c and uphold wrongful birth claims (Table I).
These courl.s almost universally allow recovery of damages for
extraordinary expenses due to the cbild's affliction, but prohibit
recovery of normal child-rearing expenses. The decisions differ
regarding whether damages are recoverable for Ihe parents'
emotional distress.
Sixteen of these wrongful birth cases involved children with a
genetic impairment such as Down syndrome, Tay Sachs
disease, or cy.siic fibrosis (Table 1). Seven involved children
with non-genetic congenital defects such as rubella syndrotne or
birth defects resulting from cytomegalovirus. One case involved
spina bifida, the causes of which are not clearly understood, and
in two cases in Nevada the courts did not discuss whether or not
the impairment bad a genetic component. The nature of the
impairment (genetic or non-genetic) generally has no bearing on
the legal outcome in wrongful birth actions.
A minority (six) l^'i state high courts or federal courts thai have
considered the issue have refused to recognize wrongful binh
actions (Table I). All six such cases involved children with
genetic impairments. These courts rejected such claims either
because of a specific statute prohibiting them, or ba.scd on the
court's judgincnt that the existence ol' a human life, even with
severe impairments, cannot constitute a cognizable legal injury,
i.e. an injury that Ihe law is willing to redress.
There are also a significant number of states (IQ) that have no
state high court or federal court case law addressing the validity
of wrongful birlh claims in those states. The majority of these 19
states have no intcrmediale appellate case law either. Those few
states with intermediate appellate case law tend to vary in their
approach to wrongful binh claims and damages in a parallel
manner lo the states with high court decisions. Trial court
decisions are not discussed here, becau.se they do not carry the
same precedential value as appellate cases.
Wrongful life court decisions
In contrast to wrongful birth claims, the vast majority (25) of
states wilh stale high court or federal court decisions have
refused to recognize claims for wrongful life (Table 2). Of
these, the majority (IK) involved children with genetic
impairments; the minority involved children with non-genetic
congenital impairmcnls. The overwheltiiing reason given for
refusing to recognize wrongful life claims is Ihe inability or
unwillingness of courts or jurors to weigh the value of an
impaired life against the value of non-existence.
Only four stales have high state court or federal court decisions
that recognize wrongful life claims. All of these cases, except
the Washington case, involved children with genetic
impairments. These decisions have generally allowed recovery
of damages only for extraordinary expenses required to Ireat
the child's ailment, and have not permitted recovery of general
damages for having been born with an impairment.
As with wrongful birth, there are also a significant number of
states (22) that have no slate high court or federal court case
law addressing the validity of wrongful life claims. Similarly,
the majority of these slates also have no intermediate appellate
case law, Those relatively few states with decisions by an
intertnediate appellate court tend to vary in their analysis in the
same manner as do the states wilh high court decisions. Here
too, trial court decisions are not discussed because they do not
carry the same precedential value as appellate cases.
Wrongful conception court decisions
The vast majority of states (32) have state high court or federal
court decisions recognizing wrongful conception claims
(Table 3). Of the 32 stales, there are 35 state high court or
federal court opinions. 33 of which are negligent sterilization
cases, one is a failed abortion case (Pennsylvania), and one
involved failure to diagnose a pregnancy (Alaska). Only six
states reject such claims.
Tahic I. State high courts' or federal ct>urts" decisions on wrongful binh according to state.
:inii mid uphnhlinii cUiinis for wKnif^jiii hinh
Alabama, ,'\rizona, California, Colorado. Delaware, Washington, D.C., I-'lorida. Idaho, Illinois. Indiana, Kansas, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts. Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey. New York. Oklahoma, Pennsylvania. South Carolina. Texas,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin
Based on ca.ses iiivotviiiii children n-itli :^eiiciic impairiuents
Alabama, California, Colorado, Delaware, Washington, D.C., Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts. New Jersey,
New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina. Virginia. West Virginia
Based on c<isc.s involvin)^ cliildren wilh non-i-enetic con}:;cniial imixiiniwnts
Arizona. Idaho, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Texas. Washington. Wisconsin.
Presence oj n frenetic component not discussed
Nevada
Rcjiisinii Id uphold claims for wroniifiil hirlh
Georgia. Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, and Utah
No case.s
Nineteen states have no court cases
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Table 2. Stiite hiyh cntiris' or federal courts" decisions on wrongful life according \o state.
Rci<>};nizi'iti oud upholtliiii; citiiiiisJor wroiiiifiil life
California. Maine, New Jersey, Washington
Ri'iti.siiiii chibiis for wroiii^fiil life
Arizona. Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho. Illinois. Kansas. Kentucky, Maryland. Massachusetts, Michigan. Minnesota,
Missouri. New Hiimp.shire. New York. North Carolina, Ohio. Pennsylvania. South Carolina. Texas. Utah. West Virginia.
Wisconsin. Wyoming
liivolviiiii chikiri'ii wilh i^i'iiciic inipairmenis
Colorado. Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Kansas. Kentucky. Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New York. North
Caroline, Ohio. Pennsylvania. Soth Carolina. Utah. West Virginia
liivolviiiii childri'ii wilh iioii-i;i'iic!ic iiiiii^i'iiilal iiiijHiiriDciils
Arizona, Idaho, New Hampshire. Texas. Wisconsin, Wyoming, Indiana
No law
Alaska. Aiahania. Arkansas. Connecticut. Washington, D.C.. Georgia, Hawaii. Iowa. Louisiana. Mississippi, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada. New Mexico. North Dakota. Oklahoma, Oregon. Rhode Island. South Dakota. Tennessee. Vermont. Virginia
Tiihle 3. Slate high L.-ouris' or federal courts' decisions on wrongftil life according to state.
ii! iiiid uphoidiiiii claims for wroiiiifid coiiccplioii initijorilv iiivolviiiii healthx children)
Alabama. Alaska. Arizona. Arkansas. Connecticut, Washington. D.C.. Florida. Georgia, Illinois. Indiana. Kansas, Louisiana,
Maine. Maryland, Massachusetts. Minnesota. Missouri. New Hampshire. New Mexico, North Carolina. Ohit). Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah. Vermont. Virginia. Washington, West Virginia. Wisconsin. Wyoming
L'i'lioUliiii; vkiiiu.s in cases involving cluldrcn niih iinpairincnts
Connecticut (orthopedic abnormality). Florida (congenital defects), Georgia (club foot). Louisiana (albinism). North Carolina
(genetic defect), Ohio (birth defect). Pennsylvania (neurofibroniatosis)
Sidles also iiulndini; cosis of rcarini; Iwallhx child in full
New Mexico. Oregon, Washington
Stales allowiiii; i i>sis of retiring heallhy cliild hiil offset hv henefils ofrcariiii; child
Arizona, Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts. Minnesota
Denyiiii; recttverv since il wus not a foreseeiihle consequence ofne^lii-eni sterilization
Ohio. Louisiana
Hirlh impairment considered when asscssiiii; other ddinai-e.s hut no! tdlowini> costs of child rearing
Florida, Georgia, Pennsylvania




Rcjectini' claims for wroni^fid tom eption
Iowa (failed abortion). Kentucky. New York. Oklahoma. Texas (last three for negligent sterilization) (all involving healthy
children)
Incliidin^ii both heallhy chiUhen and Iho.se born wilh coiifienilal impairmeiUs
Texas
Heidthx children onl\
New York. Oklahoma. Kentueky. Nevada
No law
California, Colorado, Delaware. Hawaii (decision but only addressed civil procedure issues, not underlying action). Idaho.
Michigan. Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska. New Jersey. North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota
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Of the majority of states that recognize wrongful conception
claims, most of the cases (28) involved healthy children.
Relatively few (seven) involved impaired children. In those
cases involving healthy children, most states (21) do not allow
recovery for child-rearing expenses, but only for any actual
damages related to the sterilization or other procedLre(s).
pregnancy, and birth, which generally include medical
expenses, pain and suffering of the mother related to
pregnancy and childbirth, lost wages of the mother, and 'loss
of consortiutn' (financial compensation for the loss of
companionship, in this context usually of a spouse). A minority
of stales also allows recovery of the costs of child rearing,
either in full or offset by the benefit derived by the parents of
raising a healthy child (Table 3).
In the seven cases involving children born with impairments,
two states denied any recovery related to the birth defect
because the birth defect was not a foreseeable consequence of
Ihe negligent sterilization. Three states allowed consideration
of the defect in assessing other damages (such as emotional
distress or special medical needs) but did not allow child-
rearing expenses. One state allowed recovery of the costs of
raising the child without any offset for benefit to parents.
Another state adopted a 'ca.se-by-case' approach where the
court found the value of the benefit (of having a child) should
mitigate or offset the damages to the extent equitable.
A minority of states (six) have state high court or federal court
cases rejecting claims for wrongful conception. Of those six
states, all addressed claims involving healthy children, and one
of them. Texas, addressed claims involving both healthy
children and children with congenital impairments. All of
these cases were negligent sterilization cases, except for the
Iowa decision, which was a failed abortion case. The courts
rejected the claims based on a lack of injury or damage to ihe
parents, refusing to consider the birth of a healthy child to be
a legally cognizable injury. The court in Iowa rejected such
claims on the basis thai ihe benefits of a healthy cbild
outweigh the associated monetary burdens. Texas, the one
state addressing both healthy children and impaired children,
rejected all such claims and concluded that a birth defect
makes no difference to the legal analysis because it is not a
foreseeable consequence of a failed sterilization.
A relatively small number of states (I3i have no slate high
court or federal case law on wrongful conception (Table 3).
Defendants in wrongful conception or wrongful birth cases
may seek to deny culpability on the basis that the plaintiff
consented to the treatment or the procedure. While a court may
examine a consent document lo see whether it addresses the
conduct at issue, generally courts have found that such
documents do noi remove or reduce a professional's liability
resulting from negligent conduct, such as medical malpractice.
Courts have determined that, as a matter of public policy.
professionals should not be able to protect themselves from
their own negligence, as opposed to any inherent risks of a
procedure or condition, through disclaimers or waivers that
attempt to transfer the risks to patients or non-professionals.
Some courts have also noted that patients are not in an equal
bargaining position with a medical professional and it would
be unfair to enforce a waiver for that reason. Tbe extent to
which language in signed consent forms that outline risks may
limit professional exposure is therefore unclear, particularly
because state laws and courts vary regarding tbe degree to
which they lake such forms into account.
State statutes addressing wrongful
birth/wrongful life
A state's laws can comprise both statutes and court decisions.
A state can develop a body of common law from that state's
court decisions, and then pass a statute that essentially codifies
that body of common law, supplants the common law. or
complements it. depending on the wording of the statute.
Following the enactment of a statute, court cases may then
start building a body of law interpreting thai statute. Ten states
have enacted legislation (Table 4). In six of these, state laws
prohibit actions for both wrongful life and wrongful birth. Two
prohibit only wrongful life actions. One limits damages for the
birth of. and to a child harmed as a result of. professional
negligence. At least three of the states that have enacted
statutory bans oti wrongful birth or wrongful life claims have
done so in support of eacb state's stated public policies of
respecting the right to life of all humans, bom or unborn,
healthy or unhealthy, and disfavouring abortion. The statutes
in these states provide that a cause of action shall not arise
based on a claim that, 'but for" the act or omission of another.
a person would bave been aborted. Maine's legislative intent is
reflected in its statutory language: '(i)t is the intent of the
Legislature that the birth of a normal, healthy child does not
constitute a legally cognizable injury and tbat it is contrary to
public policy to award damages for the birth or rearing of a
healthy child' (Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.. 2(K)3a). A few states have
enacted statutes that prohibit recovery of child-rearing
expenses in actions for wrongful conception or negligent
sterilization (Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.. 2003b; Mich. Comp. Laws,
2004).
Wrongful birth/life cases arising
through assisted reproductive
technologies
Wrongful birth and wrongful life issues bave arisen in a small
number of cases involving children bom through the use of
assisted reproduction, donor gametes, and PGD.
Court decisions involving PGD
Wrongful life issues were identifted and rejected by a court in
one of the only two cases reported to date involving PGD (both
were trial level cases involving children born with cystic
fibrosis after mistaken assurances that the tested embryo was
not affected). A Massachusetts trial court rejected claims
brought on behalf of an affected child and by his parents, and
refused to recognize the injury based on a new legal claim of
•preconception tort' (Doolan vs IVF America, 2000). Instead,
the court characterized the claims as ones for wrongful life,
which it ruled were precluded by precedent in that state. The
court further found that the defective gene itself, not the
defendant physicians, had caused the defect, a distinction that
also carries over to cases involving donor gametes with
undetected or unreported genetic abnormalities, as discussed
below. The court's opinion did not address whether the consent
forms adequately outlined the risks of PGD or whether PGD
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Table 4. State statutes addressing wrongful birth and/or wrongful life.
Enacted statutes
California. Indiana. Maine. Michigan, Minnesota. Missouri. North Dakota. Pennsylvania. South Dakota, Utah
Prohibit both wron^iful lije and hirih
Michigan. Minnesota. Missouri. Pennsylvania, South Dakota. Ulah
Prohibit nroniifiil life onix
Indiana. North Dakota
Liniii damages for professional negligence only
Maine
Prohibit recovery of child-rearinfi, e.\penses for wrongful conception or negligent sterilization
Maine, Michigan
was considered an experimental procedure. The second PGD
case involved access to certain research records and is
discussed below in the context of breach of professional duty.
A small number of other alleged failures of PGD have resulted
in lawsuits, but have settled and therefore no court decisions
have followed.
Court decisions involving genetic
abnormalities from donor gametes
Two cases have been brought against professionals who failed
to identify or inform intended parents of a genetic abnormality
in their chosen sperm or egg donor, after which a child was
born with a serious genetic abnormality. In one ease, a
California sperm bank failed to report a sperm donor's family
history of kidney disease, although he had allegedly noted it on
his donor intake form. The child was subsequently bom with
autosomal dominant poly cystic kidney disease (APK.D}
(Johnson vs Superior Court. 2002). In the second, a New York
assisted reproduction medical programme overlooked and
therefore failed to notify the intended parents that their
selected egg donor had tested positive as a carrier for cystic
fibrosis (Paretta vs Med. Offices for Human Reproduction.
200,'̂ ). They conceived and their child was bom with the
disease.
In the California sperm bank case, multiple legal issues were
raised and argued, including whether or not the bank was
protected under state statutes designed to protect health care
providers. The California trial court held that the sperm bank
was exercising professional skills as a health care provider,
even it" not engaged in a physician-patient relationship, and
therefore fell within Ihat state's statutory protections. The
court rejected the parents' arguments that the bank was
operating solely as a commercial business selling
spermatozoa. As with the PGD cases, tbe court found that the
donor's genes, and not the defendant sperm bank, caused the
child's genetic abnormalities, and therefore the sperm bank
could not be held legally responsible for the child's disease.
Following Califomia's established law. the court rejected the
child's claim of wrongful life. The New York court also
rejected both general damages and arguments that the
defendant professionals, rather than the donor, had 'caused' the
child's abnormalities. The New York trial court also
characterized and rejected the claim as one for wrongful life.
refusing to recognize either a tort of 'negligent preconception
or pre-implantation counselling" or any obligation to perform
PGD. and relied on older New York case law which disallows
general damages.
Other court cases involving
reproductive genetics
In addition to the extension of wrongful birth/wrongful life
theories to encompass new reproductive technologies such as
PGD, other issues are beginning to arise from genetic testing,
genetic information, and genetic material in the context of
assisted reproduction. The remainder of this article provides a
summary analysis of those relatively few cases, as well as a
limited number of recent cases that, although not directly
involving reproductive genetics, present related issues and
thus may be helpful in understanding legal approaches that
may be used to resolve conflicts involving reproductive
genetics. Given the small number of cases and the fact that
state laws differ, the cases are more illustrative of current
approaches than predictive of how specific future disputes may
be resolved.
Court decisions involving failure to warn
family members
Cases involving reproductive genetics are likely to arise from
a patient, a patient's parent, or a research subject claiming that
a health professional caused harm by his or her negligent or
intentional act or failure to act. In order to find a health
professional liable, he or she must be found to have had a duty
to the plaintiff(s) and to have breached that duty by falling
below the applicable standard of care, and the breach has to
have caused the alleged injury. Courts must therefore define
the types of relationships that give rise to a duty, the scope of
that duty, the standard of care owed as a result of that duty, and
when the statute of limitations (the time during which the
lawsuit may be initiated) for a breach of thai duty begins to
run. Where a child has resulted from the negligent act. some
courts have followed their state's wrongful birth, wrongful life,
or wrongful conception analyses, as discussed above, while
others have analysed the case under privacy, negligence and
medical malpractice principles.
Failure to provide accurate genetic information has been the
basis of claims against both treating physicians and
researchers. Courts have frequently looked to whether or not
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the defendant had a relationship wilh. and thus a duty to, the
plaintiff patient or family member. Researchers, as opposed to
treating physicians, are generally held not to have a physician-
patient relationship with their research subjects, and thus have
been found not to have a duty to wam patients or family
members as to a genetic vulnerability. For example, in a case
involving a state-wide randomized, blinded control study of
newborns for cystic fibrosis. the researchers were found nol
liable to the parents or younger affected sibling for not
learning of. or warning the parents about, the older child's
positive test (Ande vs Rock. 2002). The plaintiffs had been
part of a state-wide cystic fibrosis research protocol in which
excess blood was drawn from all newborns and used to test
them for cystic tlbrosis. Under the research protocol, the
parents of half of the newboms were told of a positive test and
those infants were put on a nutrition plan, while the test results
of the second half were not revealed. The goal ol the study was
to ascertain whether nutritional supplements slowed the
progression of cystic fibrosis. The plaintiffs were in the group
who were not notified, and therefore did not leam of (heir
child's diagnosis until the child reached the age of 2 years, and
after they were pregnant wilh a second child. Thai child was
also diagnosed with cystic fibrosis, and one of the parents"
claims was that had they been given the newborn screening
results, they would not have conceived their second child.
In a widely cited non-genetics research case, however, a
Maryland appellate court came to the opposite conclusion
(Grimes vs Kennedy Krieger Insl., 2001). That court found
that a 'special relationship' was created between the
researchers and their minor subjects and therefore negligence
and breach of contract claims could be brought on behalf of
minor plaintiffs against researchers who conducted an
allegedly non-therapeulic research experiment (i.e. one that
provided no benefit to the research subjects) and involved
more than minimal risk. The court noted that minors were
vulnerable research subjects, and that informed consent by
parents on behalf of their children for non-therapeutic research
raised serious legal, moral and ethical concerns.
In one of only two reported cases involving PGD. where a
child was born with cystic fibrosis after a mistaken assurance
that the tested embryo was not affected, an Illinois
intermediate appellate court refused to allow a plaintiff
access to the IRB-approved research protocol documents,
ruling they were privileged by state statute and nol designed
to facilitate truth seeking in private malpractice cases (Doe vs
Masonic Med Ctr. 1998). The couple had sought the
acknowledged experimental procedure to ensure their second
child would not be born with the disorder after their firsi
child was bom with it.
Courts have come to different conclusions regarding a
treating physician's duly to a patient's immediate family
members. For example, in a few reported assisted
reproduction cases a husband has sued his wife's physician
for performing artificial insemination with donor
spermatozoa without the husband's consent. Two courts,
based on their slate's relevant statutes, have come to
opposite conclusions on the question ot whether or not the
physician owed a duty to the patient's husband (Kerns vs
Schmidt, 1994; Shin vs Kong, 2000).
Inherited conditions also raise ihe issue of whether and whom
a treating physician has a duty lo warn, how that duty, once
defined, is met. and how to balance that duty with a duty of
confidentiality u> the patient. While it is impossible to
generalize or identify trends given the limited number of cases
and variety of state laws and standards, certain analytical
issues are evident. A few cases are illustrative.
In a Minnesota case (Molloy vs Meier, 2004). that state's
highest appellate court ruled that there was a duty to wam a
biologically related parent in a case involving a child with
fragile X. After the child was born, her mother remarried, and
the mother and new husband were falsely reassured, based on
incorrectly read test results, that the child did not have fragile
X. The mother then proceeded, with her new husband, to
conceive a child who was also affected with fragile X. The
court affirmed the lower appellate court's finding, including a
duty to wam family members about the tlrst child's condition
existed, which would be met by telling either biological parent.
The intermediate court explicitly noted that there was no duty
owed to the wife's new spouse, because he bad no biological
relationship wilh the first child, a finding the parties did not
appeal and which was thus not ruled on. The higher court
noted that the parties conceded the duty to wam would have
been met by informing an appropriate 'contact person', such as
either of the custodial parents or Molloy as the non-custodial
biological parent. In allowing the claim, the court framed the
parents' claim as one for wrongful conception, and not as
wrongful birth or life (both of which had been prohibited by
stale statute). The court also addressed a statute of limitations
issue, mling that under the circumstances the damage did not
occur and thus the statute did nol begin lo mn until the
conception of the second child. The intermediate court
acknowledged that doing so created the possibility thai cases
involving inherited genelic defects might not be discovered
and therefore filed until years, and potentially decades, after
the wrongtui act. That potential problem, it found, was an issue
lo be addressed by the legislature.
In two cases involving adult-onset inherited genetic disorders,
courts found a duly to warn family members, although the
requirements the courts imposed for meeting that duty
differed. First, in a Florida case brought by the adult daughter
of a ihyroid cancer patient (Pate vs Threlkel. 1995). the court
found the parent's treating physician had a duty to warn family
members, but that such duty would be met by the physician
warning only the patient. The eourt explicitly acknowledged
that the disorder, medullary thyroid carcinoma, was a
'genetically transferable disease'. The court found that most
patients would tell family members, and that any other
requirements could compromise confidentiality and be unduly
burdensome on a physician.
Second, in a New Jersey case (Safer vs Estate of Pack, 1996).
an intennediate appellate court found a broader duty to wam
the plaintiff. The case was brought by the adult child of a
patient who had died (when the plaintiff was a child) of colon
cancer resulting from multiple polyposis, an inherited
syndrome that in virtually alt untreated eases leads to colon
cancer. Noting that it disagreed with Ihe Florida court's ruling
on how that duty could be met, the New Jersey court found that
in some instances a duty to wam of a genetic risk might not be
satisfied solely by informing the patient rather than his or her
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family members direetly. Finding "a duty to warn of avertable
risk from genetic causes' is 'by definition a matter of familial
concern', the court found a duty was owed to "members of the
immediate family of the patient who may be adversely affected
by a breach of that duty".
Both the Florida and New Jersey cases were brought by the
child of a patienl and neither court further defined the terms
'immediate' or 'family member". The Florida court did note
that the prevailing standard of care, meaning the average
degree of skill and care exercised by members of the medical
profession in the same or similar locality given the present
state of medicine, created a duty 'that is obviously for the
benefit of certain identified ihird parties', lo whom a duty is
therefore owed, including 'a patient's children |who| fall
within the zone of foreseeable risk'. The court also noted that
the slandard of care, as in any malpractice ease, is determined
by a consideration of expert testimony on the question of the
accepted or prevailing medieal custom in and for that type of
eonimunity.
Given ihe extremely limited case law, the scope of a health
care provider's duty to wiim family members of genetic risks
remains an un.settled area al this time.
Court decisions involving compelled
testing to determine parentage
Genetic testing, both voluntary and compelled, has been
widely available for many years and literally thousands of
cases have been reported thai involve testing in the context of
proving palernity for Ihe purpose of requiring child support or
proving identity in criminal prosecutions, both of which are
outside the scope of this article. Since the advent of the
assisted reproductive lechnologies. a few cases have been
reported in which one party seeks lo compel genetic testing lo
determine the parentage of a child. Hfforts to legally compel
such testing have for the most part been unsuccessful. Coutis
have generally followed established state law on when
paternity testing is and is not permitted, and most states require
that the person seeking to have the child tested must first
demonstrate a minimal, "threshold' level parental relationship,
or attempted relationship, to attempt lo prove their own
parentage of the child. Thus, in a lawsuit brought by a woman
alleging that her embryos had been implanted into the wrong
woman, a court refu.sed lo compel genelic testing of i4-year-
old twins who had never lived with, or developed any
relationship with, the plaintiff who elaimed to be their genetic
molher (Prato-Morrison vs Doe, 2002). Similarly, in a lawsuit
brought by a man who in a written contract previously
acknowledged being a sperm donor, a court refused to test
twins being raised by a lesbian couple (Lamaritata vs Lucas.
2002). However, as discussed below, where gamete or embryo
"mix-ups' may be involved and the claim is brought promptly,
genetic testing may be part of the litigation.
Court decisions involving disputed use of
reproductive material
Disputes over the use of reproductive material, including eggs,
spermatozoa and embryos, can arise in a variety of contexts,
such as contested parentage of bom children, custody of frozen
embryos, misappropriation of gametes by health care
providers, or control over gametes or tissue by donors,
intended parents, and researchers. All raise standard of care
issues for the professionals involved and thus require a
determination of what level of care professi{)nals are to be held
to. Discussed here are only those cases and theories with an
impact on reproductive genetics.
Cases involving parentage or custody disputes over already-
born children are typically analysed using legal theories of
tort, negligence, or breach of contract, as well as applicable
family law prineiples or statutes. These cases are largely
beyond the scope of a summary of reproductive genetics law.
Cases can, however, arise following the alleged wrongful
implantation of reproductive material, for example, if gametes
or embryos are mixed-up during IVF, In such cases, in addition
to lawsuits between patients to resolve competing claims of
legal parentage, claims will probably be filed against the
health professionals involved in causing the mix-up. When an
anonymous egg or spermatozoon is utilized, claims may be
limited to those brought by one set of parents against the
professional who supplied the genetic material or performed
the medical procedures. These latter cases may be analysed
under a 'wrongful life' theory, and in some cases damages for
healthy children have been rejected if the state does not
recognize this theory (Harchiner vs Univ of Utah, 1998).
Where mix-ups result in competing claims of parentage,
family or probate litigation has been highly publicized, and
involves difficult and novel judicial decisions about legal
parentage [for example, Perry-Rogers vs Fasano, 2001; Perry-
Rogers vs Obasaju,200l: Robert vs Susan, 2003). C//J/). denied
2003 Cal LHXIS 6671 (Cal,. 2OO3)|,
One dispute involving control and use ul' healthy donor
gametes in Texas illustrates the inadequacy of the law, even in
a state with laws addressing eontrol of donor eggs or parentage
of the resulting children. In that case, a commercially recruited
egg donor learned that her donated eggs had been 'split' or
shared between two couples at the same IVF clinic at the
suggestion of their physician. The donor had entered into a
written legal agreement with the first couple only, which
reportedly contained an explicit provision that only that couple
could use the eggs. The donor and the second couple, who had
created but then been precluded from using the embryos
created with some of those eggs, each filed lawsuits against the
physician and broker. In recommending the sharing
arrangement, the physician reportedly had relied on Texas law,
which states that egg donors are not parents of children
resulting from their donated gametes (Texas Family Code,
2003). At least two multi-party lawsuits were filed, by the
donor and by the second couple. The donor's suit was
reportedly settled for an undisclosed financial settlement from
the doctor and clinic and the second couple, who ultimately
were allowed to use the embryos, were dismissed from that
lawsuit (Houston Chronicle, 2002). A lawsuit between the
broker and physician resulted in a verdict for the broker (TX
3/22/05)
In another unique fact pattern illustrating the complexity of
these issues, a single woman and married couple litigated the
legal parentage of a child born to the single woman, whom she
intended to be from a donated embryo, instead the physician
accidentally transferred an embryo created for the married
couple as part of their own infertility treatment (Robert vs
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Susan, 2003). Because the eouple had used donor eggs to
create their embryos (and their one resulting child to date), the
child at the centre of the dispute was the genetic child of the
married man but not of his wife. The irial court has ruled that
the single woman was the child's mother and the married man
was the father (and not a donor a.s she had argued, since he
never intended to donate his spermatozoa or embryos). That
court further found that the father's wife, who had no genetic
or gestational claim to the child, had no legal claim to
maternity. The court did not address the fact that the wife was
the intended mother of any child who might result from the
embryos she and her husband had created. The single mother
also sued the physician, resulting in a settlement.
In the mid-1990s, a highly publicized series of both civil and
criminal court cases arose involving three physicians at the
University of California-Irvine's Centre for Reproductive
Health. It was discovered that, without iheir patients'
knowledge or consent, the physicians had taken eggs and
embryos from reportedly hundreds of patients, and implanted
them in other patients. Drs Ricardo Asch. Jose Balmaccdu and
Sergio Stone were all criminally charged based on allegations
of insurance fraud and false income tax return filings.
Two of the doctors fled the country: Dr Stone was convicted
and served time in jail. Civil suits were filed by and
against the university, which settled the majority of over 100
separate patient lawsuits brought ajzainst it based
on research misconduct and misappropriation of gametes,
embryos and funds by the physicians (sec
http://www.uci.edu/fc/chronology.htm!). The scandal
ultimately led the California General Assembly to pass the
nation's first law making it a crime to steal human eggs and
embryos (Welch. 2000).
In one of the very few reported court decisions stemming from
(he scandal, a couple sued another family to try to determine if
they were the genetic parents of 14-year-old twins. The trial
court refused to order blood tests or visitation, and dismissed
the case. That court's ruling was upheld on appeal, with the
appelhitc court ruling that no link to the twins had heen shown,
but that, even if the couple suing had shown such a link, the
best interests of the teenage children was to dismiss the case
(Prato-Morrison vs Doe, 2002).
There have been a growing number of cases involving control
over frozen embryos or pre-embryos, usually following a
couple's divorce. The term pre-embryo is often used to clarify
in-vitro fertilized eggs that have not been implanted or gone
beyond the very early stages of development (Jones and Veeck.
2002). One notable trend has been toward not permitting the
use of frozen embryos for procreation over the objection of a
spouse or a former spouse, notwithstanding any prior consent
or agreement by the parties. A very recent jury trial ended with
a finding in favour of the former husband who claimed an IVF
programme transferred previously frozen embryos to his wife
to have a second child without his knowledge or consent, and
contrary to his wishes (Gladu vs Boston IVF). The couple had
previously conceived twins at the IVF programme, using fresh
embryos created with the man's spermatozoa and donor egg.
At issue was the language and status of the cryopreservation
consent document he signed ai the time the embryos were
created. He argued it was a contracl. and required the
programme physicians to obtain his consent at the time of any
subsequent transfer. The IVF programme contended the
document was an informed consent document, and that the
husband's prior consent, unless withdrawn by him, could be
properly relied upon for subsequent embryo transfers. The jury
found the physicians were not negligent but found the
programme liable for breach of contract, and awarded the man
US$98,000 in child support, and US$10,000 in emotional
distress damages. The case illustrates the difficulty in
categorizing documents and actions taken by patients and
professionals in this area. Although this jury apparently found
the consent document at issue was a legal agreement and did
not give the programme the right to future implantations
without subsequent consents, there is little precedent in this
area and no assurance that other juries or couils would reach
the same conclusion.
Some courts have questioned whether assisted reproduction
clinics" cryopreservation forms are entbiceable contracts, either
between the patients and the programme or between the two
patients themselves. The issue of enforceability can arise if there
is a subsequent disagreement between a husband and wife over
whether and how to use or dispose of their embryos or in a
dispute between patients and a medical programme. Prior
consents or agreements with medical programmes to use frozen
embryos for other than procreation (i.e. for research or to discard)
have generally been upheld. The very few reported disputes
between patients iind providers that ha\c raised the issue of who
ha.s control of embryos have generally found that the patient, not
the provider or clinic, had their right to control the embryos (Del
Zio vs Columbia Presbyterian Med. Ctr. 1978: York vs Jones.
1989).
Access to and use of cryopreserved (frozen) spermatozoa, and
the resulting parentage of children born from sperm
cryopreserved prior to the death of the genetic contributor,
have also been the subjects of recent litigation in a growing
number of states. No consensus has yet emerged as to the
degree of proof required prior to allowing, for example, a
widow to use her deceased spouse's spermatozoa, or what
requirements must be met prior to any resulting child being
legally recognized as the child of the decedent. Massachusetts
has set out a three-prong test for determining parentage and
inheritance; proof of genetic parentage, proof of the decedent's
consent to use the sperm, and proof of the decedent's intent to
support the child (Woodward vs CommV of Soc. Sec. 2002).
A lower federal court in Arizona precluded posthumous
recognition of legal parentage and denied Social Security
survivor's benefits to twins conceived more than 10 months
after their genetic father's death (Gillett-Netting vsComm'rof
Soc. Sec. 2002). based on an interpretation of Arizona's
intestacy laws (laws dealing with inheritance when one has
died without a legal will) which expressly provided that only a
child surviving the deceased parent or in gestation at the time
of death may inherit. However, the appellate court reversed.
finding the children were legal heirs ad rejecting the
applicability of the narrower laws. Whether posthumously
conceived children are entitled to legal recognition and
inheritance rights varies from state to state, depending on both
that state's statutory inheritance laws and judicial
interpretation.
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Court decisions involving use of
non-reproductive genetic material
Control and use oi' other bodily tissue or genetic material,
spcvifically that contained in non-reproductive tissue, has been
[he subject of limited litigation to date. The most well known
such case involved disputed ownership and control over the
blood and tissue obtained from a piiticiit diagnosed wilh hairy-
cell leuk:icniiii(Moore vs Regents of Univ. of Cal., 1990). The
treating physician had recommended the removal of the
patient's spleen and thereafter, over a period of several years.
had him return tor further removal of blood and tissue. During
thai time, he and his colleagues successtully engaged in whal
the court described as "potentially lucrative medical research'
in which ihcy developed and patented a ceil line from the
patient's T lymphocytes. The patient sued the treating
physician and his colleagues who used the cells without his
knowledge or permission.
The court ruled on two claims, allowing one while rejecting
the other. Kirst. the court ruled the claim could proceed on the
basis of an alleged breach of the physician's disclosure
obligations to his patient, and held ihat a treating physician
must disclose any interests he has unrelated to his patient's
health, 'whether research or economic, that may affect his
judgment". Second. Ihc ct>urt rejected the patient's claim for
conversion, meaning Ihe unauthorized and wrongful exercise
o\ control over another person's personal property (i.e.
stealing). Noting that no court had ever imposed conversion
liability for use of human cells in medical research, the court
declined to 'impo.sc a ion duty on scientists to investigate the
consensual pedigree of each human cell sample used in
research'. The court noted thai it would compromise the
exchange of scientific knowledge and threaten economic
incentives lo conduct importanl medical research to extend the
theory of conversion to this circumstance. In Ihe ct>urt's words,
"llfl ihe use of cells in research is a conversion, then with
c\ery cell sample a researcher purchases a licket in a litigaiion
lottery'.
Another more reccni. and still ongoing, case has also arisen in
the contcxi of a patent dispute (Greenberg vs Miami Children's
Hosp. Research Institute. 2002). A patients' rights group sued
medical researchers who discovered the gene for Canavan
disease and then filed a patent for il wiihoiit the group's
knowledge. The plaintiffs argued ihat they had worked tt)
gather tissue, identify families, and provide financial support
to the defendant researchers, with the intention of assisting in
the development of non-commercial advances in research and
treatment. In their lawsuit, they claimed the defendants had
breached a duty of informed consent, as well as a fiduciary
duty to them, had been 'unjustly enriched' by the discovery
and patent, and had fraudulently concealed and converted their
pR>pcrty, as well as misappropriated 'trade secrets', in this case
the list of patients suffering from the disease.
The federal court dismissed most ofthe patient group's claims.
Similar to the few cases involving genetic information or
material noted earlier, and noiing with approval the case
involving the patient with hairy celt leukaemia, the federal
districi court refused to impose a duty of disclosure on medical
researchers regarding their economic interests in the absence
of a physician-patient relationship, finding that such a duly
would be unworkable and would kill medical research. It also
found no fiduciary relalionship under applicable slale (Florida)
law. finding that such a relationship required both trust and
acceptance, and the latter was missing. The court refused to
find that undertaking the research itself created such a
relationship. It also rejected any claim that the plaintiffs had a
property interest in the tissue or resulting information and
therefore rejected the conversion claim. The only claim
allowed to stand was one for 'unjust enrichment', i.e. that the
researchers may have unfairly been enriched in collecting their
license fees since plaintiffs contributed so much to the research
effort and would not have done so had they known the
researchers intended to commercialize the tcsling process
resulting from the genetic material they contributed lo them
rather than keeping any testing developed in the public
domain. Because the plaintiffs alleged an ongoing research
collabt)ratidn, as t)pposed to simply a donor-donee
relationship, the court denied the researchers' attempt to 'seek
refuge' tiehind the patent, as well as their argument that the
plaintiffs had obtained what they sought: the isolation of the
gene and the development of a screening test for it.
Genetic discrimination
As genetic testing becomes more widely available, concems
have been repcaledly voiced over the polenlial misuse of
genetic intbrmation, particularly in the workplace and by health
insurance companies. A number of state laws have been enacted
that prohibit genetic discrimination in employment or
insurance. As of late 2(H)3. approximately 31 states had statutes
prohibiting employer discrimination in the workplace, while 34
states had statutes strictly prohibiting the use of genetic
information for risk selections and risk classification purposes.
In addition. Arizona, Vermont, and West Virginia require
actuarial justification for the use of genetic information: Texas
bans use of genetic information in group health plans, and
Alabama prohibits discrimination based on predisposition to
cancer. HIPAA, the first federal law directly addressing genetic
information, prohibits group health plans, usually meaning over
50 individuals, to discriminate in insurance on the basis of
'heallh siatus-related taclnr", including genetic information
(National Conference of State Legislatures).
In October 2003. Ihe US Senate unanmiousty passed Ihe
Genetic Iniormalion Nondiscrimination Act. Similar efforts in
the tJS House of Representatives have been unsuccessful
(Genetic Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance and
Employment Act, 2003). Federal or state constitutional
prelections may also be implicaled, and certain federal laws
currently iti place stich as the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) (19*^0). The Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (2000) (as
to employmeni only) may also afford some protections.
The ADA is potentially relevant to many legal issues that may
arise concerning reproductive genetics, although to date there
i.s little case law to guide its application to these issues. The
ADA prohibits discrimination against individuals with
disabilities (i) by employers of 15 or more employees; (ii) in
public accommodations; and (iii) by state and local
governments. tJnder the ADA, an individual has a disability
and is therefore prolected against discrimination if the
individual (i) has an impairment, genetic or otherwise, that
substantially limits a major life activity; (ii) has a record of
F.thics, legal, social, counselling - Rcproduc;ion. genetics and thu law - .SL Crockin
such impairment; or (iii) is regarded as having such
impairment. While a broad discussion of genetic
discrimination is beyond the scope of this article, the following
discus.sion illustrates the ways in which genetic information
may impact on employment, the provision of healthcare, and
other contexts. For many people, reproductive genetic testing
is Ihe first time they are presented with the option to oblain
genetic testing, both carrier and prenatal testing, and concerns
about the possible future employment and insurance
ramifications of learning this information for themselves and
Elieir ulTspring could intluence their decisions.
Unauthorized testing in the workplace
To date, there have been relatively few reported court
decisions involving genetic testing in the workplace, and none
involving genetic testing by health insurers. Two notable cases
have involved unauthorized testing by employers. Each case
included claims under the ADA. which will be discussed
below. But. Ihe alleged surreptitious nature of the testing is
noteworthy and is therefore separately addressed here. In the
first case (Norman-Bloodsaw vs Lawrence Berkeley, I99S), a
large research laboratory thai was operating under a contract
with the federal government and was jointly operated by the
federal government and the state of California performed
unauthorized testing of certain employees for both genetic and
non-genetic conditions as part of a general health examination.
Plaintiffs claimed that black employees were singled out for
testing for the sickle-cell anaemia trait and women (for
obvious reasons) were singled oul for pregnancy tests. The
plaintiffs claimed that the government-affiliated employer had
violated their state and federal Constilutitinal rights to privacy,
their statutory rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
which prohibits employment discrimination based on race,
colour, religion, sex. or national origin, and their rights under
the ADA. After the trial court dismissed all of the plaintiffs'
claims, the tederal Court of Appeals tor the 9th Circuit
reversed in part, finding that the employees should be
permitted to bring their claims based on Constitutional privacy
violations and Title VII. and that factual issues existed
regarding ihe privacy claims that should be resolved by the
lower court. As discussed below, the coun found that the
ADA was not violated. The EEOC. however, takes the position
that entrance exams such as medical tests arc legal only
if the examination is required of every individual hired
for that particular job category (see
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/guidance-inquiries.html).
The second case involved secret DNA testing of employees
of ihc Burlinglon Northern Santa He Railway who submitted
internal teports or work-related itijury claims. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) received
complaints from employees that their DNA was being
secretly tested by the railroad. The railroad required the test
for employees who filed internal reports or submitted work-
related injury claims based on carpal tunnel syndrome, and
was conducted without the workers' knowledge and
therefore without their voluntary and informed consent
(Press Release EEOC. 2002). In that case, both the EEOC
and the employees" union filed claims, all brought under the
ADA, resulting in an agreed upon injunction and a US$2.2
million settlement (EEOC vs Burlington N, 2002). That case
is discussed more fully in the following section.
Cases brought under the
Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA)
The ADA, genetics, and the workplace
The ADA prohibits covered employers from discriminating
against employees with disabilities in the terms and conditions
of employment and in benefits provided. The worker musl be
a "qualified individual with a disability", meaning one who is
able to perform the essential functions of the Job, with or
without reasonable accommodalions. The Act. however, also
has a specific 'safe harbour' cxcmptitig many of the decisions
pcrtainitig to insurance (including health insurance) from its
antidiscrimination provisions. The impact of this safe harbour
provision on the ability of employer-based health plans to deny
coverage tor assisted reproduction or ba.scd on the results of
genelic tests is unclear.
The ADA'S employment provisions also limit the ability of
employers to ask employees about their disabilities and to
conduct medical testing. Prior to a conditional offer of
employment, the ADA prohibits medical cxatninations or tests.
These are permitted following a condilional offer of
employment as long as the tests are required of all applicants
for a particular job category atid significatit restrictions on the
use of the information gathered are complied with. In the
laboratory workers' case discussed above, based on the lack of
evidence that the employer had disseminated or used the
information from the tests, the court found the employer had
not violated the confidentiality and record keeping
requirements In the ADA (Nornian-Bioodsaw vs Lawrence
Berkeley Lab., 1998).
In the Burlington Northern case, the EEOC alleged violation
of the ADA after receiving complaints from employees that
their DNA was being secretly tested by the railway after they
had either filed internal reports or submitted work-related
injury claims based on carpal tunnel syndrosne (Press Release,
EEOC, 2002). The EEOC first sought a preliminary injunction
against the railroad pending further investigation in which it
asked the federal district court in Iowa to order the railroad to
stop its testing practice (Press Release. EEOC. 2001a). In April
2001 the railroad entered into a settlement with the EEOC
under which it agreed not to (i) require its employees to submit
blood for genetic tests; (ii) analy.se any blood previously
obtained; (iii) evaluate, analyse or consider any gene test
analysis previously performed on any of its employees; or (iv)
retaliate or threaten to take any adverse action against any
person who opposed the genetic testing or who participated in
EEOC's proceedings (Press Release, EEOC. 2001b). A year
later, the EEOC again filed suit based on the testing policy
(EEOC vs Burlington N. 2002). EEOC and Burlington
Northern enlered into a .settlement agreement, as part of which
the railroad agreed to pay US$2.2 million to 36 employees
who had been directed to get tested (Hechler, 2002), but
admilled no wrongdoing (Baker and Daniels. 2002). No court
therefore had the opportunity to analyse the EEOC's
allegations that the railroad had violated Ihe ADA.
The EEOC has taken the position, as reflected in a 1995
compliance manual, that genetic testing violates the ADA and
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ihat basing employment decisions on genetie testing is barred
under the ADA's "regarded as" prong of the detinilion of
disability (Press Release. EEOC. 2002). Mtireover. aecording
lo one EEOC Commissioner. Ihe EEOC also takes the position
that Ihe "mere gathering of an employee's DNAmay constitule
a violation of the ADA" (EEOC vs Burlington. 2002).
Aeeording ti> ihe guidance, the "regarded as" prong "of the
definition of disability applies to individuals who arc subjected
to discrimination on the basis of genetie information relating to
illness, disease, or other disorders. Covered entities thai
discriminate against individuals on the basis of sueh genetic
information are regarding the individuals as having
impairments that substantially limit a major life aelivity"
(EEOC Compliance Manual. 2000). The EEOC's aetion
against Burlington Northern, discussed above, was consistent
with this policy. However, no eourt has ever had occasion to
eonsider ihe EEOC's interpretation: thus its enforeeability is
uncertain.
The employment provisions also prohibit employers from
discriminating againsi an employee because of that
employee's assttciation wilh an individual with a disability.
Although the courts have seldom construed this provision, it
may apply to an individual who is a genetic carrier and has
children with a genetic illness.
The ADA, genetics, and public
accommoaation
The ADA's public accommodation provisions apply to
hospitals, clinics, and the offices of health eare workers. In
iyy8. the Supreme Court held that an asymptomatic HIV-
positive woman who was denied in-ofl'ice dental treatment was
disabled within the meaning ofthe ADA (Bragdon vs. Abbott,
I99S). The Coun held that HIV was a 'physical impairment',
and that it substantially limited the "major life activity' of
reproduction, in Ihat she would risk transmitting HIV to both
her partner and child in the process. Thus the woman was
disabled within Ihe meaning of ihe ADA. By this logic, a
person with genes causing a late onsei disease (e.g.
Huntington) or a carrier of a genetic mutation could be
considered disabled, since they would risk transmitting iheir
disease-causing genes lo Iheir offspring. Thus the Court's
ruling may have implications for those with genetie conditions
who are asymptomatic or to those who are carriers of genetic
mutations. The courts, however, have not yet had an
opportunity lo address [he application of the ADA to genetic
carriers or individuals with asymptomatic genetic conditions.
One recent ease brought and lost by a plaintilf invohed a blind
woman's claim ihal an IVE clinic that refused to continue
artificial insemination treatments for her did so in violation of
the ADA (Chambers vs Univ. Hosp.. 2000). While the
university defendant named in the lawsuit .settled with the
woman, the IVF clinic and physician went to trial, arguing that
its refusal was nol because of her blindness but because of
concerns it had over her mental condition, hygiene and ability
to childproof her home. A jury found in favour of these
defendants, and the plaintiff has Hied an appeal. Whether a
health care entity can refuse to provide an individual wiih a
particular genetic test or therapy.or with assisted reproduclion,
beeause of a genetic condition, however, has not yet been
deeided by the courts.
Conclusions
.lust as reproduction and genelics are making rapid scientific
advances, the legal issues emerging out of these developing
technologies are complex and. in many cases, unique. To date,
court decisions responding to these issues have been varying
and sometimes cc»ntradictt)ry from one jurisdiction to anolher.
As these issues continue to arise, new and mtire nuanccd legal
rules are likely to be called for. based upon an understanding
of both the law and science.
Medical professionals may find themselves thrust into an
educational role, as judges and policy makers will need lo
beeome versed in the language and substance of reproductive
science and genetics to reach reasoned results in their efforts to
both respond lo conflicts and to shape policy pntactively in the
form of legislation. Law and policy makers will also need lo
reeognize the many connections to existing areas of the law
and medicine while, at the same time, being eognizant of those
aspects that are novel. Decision makers are likely to confront
specific legal challenges involvini: determinations of causation
of genetic and chntmosoma! abnormalilies Ihat wilt challenge
existing legal frameworks involving wrongful birth,
conception and life.
Existing legal time limits for bringing claims will probably
prove inadequate for discovery of genetic abnormalities that
may not appear for generations. Further challenges will
involve defining the applicable standard of care and seope of
duty, as well as discrimination and related issues and the
applicability and limits of existing laws such as the ADA, The
overarching challenge will be to reach wise decisions and
create sound policies that are grounded in existing law while
recognizing and responding sensitively to the new realities
created by the advances in reproduction and genetics.
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China seeks good governance of research
As China opens its challenges in science to the wider
world, the correct methods for administering Ihe necessary
stimuli for more research, financial and otherwise, and
also a means of governance which is transparent and
accountable, have to be determined. A brief article in
Nature has outlined is intention to establish norms and a
code of conduct to regulate the National Natural Science
Foundation of China (NSFC). Decisions will be taken
democratically, management based on law, and the use of
funds will be effective, A senior policy maker stressed the
intention to utilize overseas brainpower and attract
overseas researchers to participate in basic research in
China.
Models studied initially were based on analyses of
legislation in other countries. These included legislative
documents from Australia and elsewhere. The model
finally adopted establishes standards for selecting experts
to review peers and panels, and to manage programme.s
and results in a fair manner. The NSFC apparently follows
these principles already. Queries arise over the amount of
money dedicated to research, which is still modest in
relation to the total spent on research and development.
One factor here concerns the very large number of projects
requiring functions spreading over >8000 projects which
apparently share ~US$340 million. Nature nevertheless
regards the new constitution as a positive step that may
tempt many overseas Chinese scientists back to their home
country. But other organizations, including the Ministry of
Science and Technology and the Chinese Academy of
Science, currently account for the largest research items
and so carry re.sponsibility for further progress. Perhaps
they tiiay follow the lead outlined by the NSFC in order to
establish fair play and good governance from the outset of
China's expansion.
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